Double  D  Amusement Company v. William B. Hawkins : Respondent\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Double "D" Amusement Company v. William B.
Hawkins : Respondent's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Jackson B. Howard; Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Double D Amusement v. Hawkins, No. 10938 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4340
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pap 
Nature of Case.................................... 1 
Disposition of Case in Lower Court.................. 1 
Relief Sought on Appeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Argument .................... "................... 4 
POINT I 
THE TRUE MEASURE OF RESPONDENT'S 
DAMAGE F10R LOSS OF PROF1TS FROM THE MA-
CHINE IN QUESTION IS ARRIVED AT BY DE-
DUCTING PROJECTED COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THAT MACHINE ONLY FROM RESPONDENT'S 
SHARE OF THE MACHINE'S PROJECTED GROSS 
REVENUE FOR THE CONTRACT PERIOD ........ 4 
POINT II 
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT COULD DETERMINE 
RESPONDENT'S LOSS OF PROFITS, RESULTING 
FROM APPELLANT'S BREACH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Conclusion ....................................... 9 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 43 
N.W. 2d 718, 41 ALR 2d 467 (1950)............ 5 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P2d 597 (1962). . . . 7 
Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.; 6 Utah 2d 187, 
309 P2d 802 (1957) ...................... · ... 7, 8 
22 Am. Jur. 2d 44, Damages, Sec. 25 ............ · ·. · 8 
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
DOUBLE "D" AMUSEMENT ) 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and 0~dent .. ""'""'l'V ' \ CASE 
vs. f NO. 10938 
' 
WILLIAM B. HAWKINS, \ 
Defendant and Appellant. , 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for breach of a conrtract by the terms 
of which appellant was to have permitted respondent to 
place an automatic music vending machine on appellant's 
business premises, in consideration for which appellant was 
to receive a percentage of the gross receipts of the ma-
chine. 
DISPOSmON OF CASE IN WWER COURT 
The respondent agrees with the appellant's statement 
of the disposition of the case in the lower court. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
trial court sustain€d contending that there was adequate 
evidence to support the finding of the court with respect 
to damages. 
STA1.'EMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent corporation, plaintiff below, is engaged in 
the business of operating amusement machines (record 
players, pinball machines, etc.) on locations in various res-
taurants and taverns. In exchange for the right to place 
its machines upon the premises respondent pays over a 
fixed pe:ricentage of the gross receipts of each machine to 
the owner or operator of the premises. 
On October 16, 1963, respondent entered into such a 
contract with appellant as owner and operator of the L-Roy 
Tavern and Lounge in Orem, Utah. Pursuant to the con· 
tract respondent placed an automatic record player on 
appellant's premises. For a period of approximately eight 
months the parties shared the gross revenues of the ma· 
chine, dividing them equally. 
On or about July 1, 1964, appellant wrongfully , 
breached the contract by removing the machine from his 
business premises. The fact of appellant's liability for 
such breach is not an issue in this appeal. 
After the initial trial, at which appellant's liability 
was established, a new trial was granted by the court pri· 
marily on the issue of damages. At the new trial the tes-
timony and exhibits received at the first trial were treated 
as again being before the court, pursuant to stipulation of 
of counsel and ruling of the court (R. 135-136). 
At the fin,'"1: trial evidence had been received of the 
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exclusively to the operation of the machine in question. 
A case directly in point which commends itself by the 
clarity and brevity of its analysis is King Features Syndi-
cate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 43 N.W. 2d 718, 41 ALR2d 
467. (1950). The case involved a contract similar to that 
in the instant case by which plaintiff was to install its 
printer telegraph machines in defendant's premises and 
defendant was to pay $10.00 a week for news reports .re-
ceived over the machines. Defendant breached the agr~ 
ment before the machines were installed. Holdmg- that 
the measure of plaintiff's damages was the gross receipts 
which plaintiff would have received, less the "cost of ob-
taining them" the court further held that: 
" . the cost of performance figure, used to di-
minish the gross payments due, did not need to include 
what might be termed the overhead or fixed expenses 
as argued by defendants. The record shows such 
items of expense would be constant whether this con-
tract was performed or not. This being true, they 
were of no interest on the question of damages for 
nonperformanoe. 
In answering a similar argument to that presented 
by the defendants here, the court in Oakland California 
Towel Co. v. Sivils, supra, said: ". . the true rule 
seems to be that the prospective profits should be 
diminished by charges composing an essential element 
in the cost of manufacture, or, as in this case, of ser-
vice. Essential elements in such cost do not include 
remorte costs, overhead or otherwise, but are confined 
to expenditures that would necessarily have been made 
in the performance of the contract. The only mat-
ter of concern is the detriment suffered or benefit lost 
as the result of the breach. If the fixed expen.ses nei-
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ther increased or decreased as a consequence of the 
nonperformance of the contract, there would be no 
loss or benefit arising from that factor." (52 Cal App2d 
517, 126 P2d 652.) 41 ALR 2d 476. 
Respondent's witness Arvid Dodge, a certified public 
accountant, after stating that he would exclude fixed costs 
of the business as a whole in determining loss of profits 
resulting from the breach testified as foll()IWs: 
"Q. (By Mr. Howard) Can you tell us why you 
think that would be the more acceptable calculation, 
based upon accounting practice? 
A. Yes. The expenses incurred by the Corpo-
ration during this period would go on whether or not 
his machine was actually in use, with one or two ex· 
ceptions: repairs and maintenance, autom01bile ex· 
pense, which undoubtedly would have been greater 
had this machine b€en in operation. 
But we have a machine here, that through obso-
lescence, if northing else, depreciation would continue, 
advertising would continue, wages would continue. All 
of these expenses incurred and sp2nt by the Corpo-
ration would continue whether or not this machine , 
brought in revenue. Therefo:ri2, in this computation 
I have tried to take the overall net income deficiency 
and deduct just those additional expenses that would 
ordinarily~which would have occured had this ma· 
chine been in operation for this period of time." (R. 
113). 
The testimony of Dodge in this particular was uncon· 
tradicted. This case is thus clearly within the reasoning 
of the King Features case, and the coW't correctly meas-
. ured respondent's loss of prof.its by deducting from gross 
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gross rece1pts of the machine in question for the eight 
months' period it was in operation on appellant's premises 
( R. 135) . From this evidence the court was a:ble to de-
termine by simple arithmetical calculation the average 
monthly gross receipts of the machine (R. 122) and the 
projected gross receipts for the life of the contract (Mem-
orandum Decision, March 17, 1967). 
At the second trial evidence was received as to :re-
spondent' s costs of doing business (R. 106-111, 127-131; 
Exhibits A-3, A-4). These costs fall into two categories: 
(a) Those general costs which enter into the calculation 
of net income of the corporation and (b) that part of the 
general costs in category (a) which relate exclusively to 
the particular machine which is part of the subject matter 
of th1s litigation, e.g., depreciation of the machine, main-
tenance costs, etc. These latter costs in category (b) were 
necessarily estimated costs over the life of the contract 
since the contract was terminated by defendant's breach 
after eight months of operation. The phrase, "she1er guess 
work", applied by counsel for appellant to these calcula-
tions (R. 108) is therefore inaccurate. The calculations 
were the work of a skilled certified public accountant and 
based largely upon accepted depreciation schedules (R. 
p. 106). 
On the basis of this evidence the court calculated re-
spondent's share ($4,050.00) of the projected gross revenue 
for the life of the contract and determined the damage 
to respO!Ildent by subtracting therefrom the projected costs 
in category (b) above for the life of the contract ($2,-
150.00) and respondent's receipts for the first eight months 
($567.25). The calculation of the court as found in its 
Memorandum iDecision is as follows: 
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"In this case the court finds the issues in favor f 
the plaintiff and against the defendant and finds th~t 
the gro.ss revenue from the music machine in defend-
ant's place of business amountfd to $67.50 per month· 
that for a five-year p2riod this would indicate total 
gross revenue of $4050.00, to which the plaintiff would 
be entitled; that the sum of $567.00 was paid from the 
machine in cash to the plaintiff leaving a balance to 
recover of $3,482.75; that the cost of operation for the 
five-year period would amount to $2,150.00, resulting 
in a loss of net revenue to the plaintiff of $1,332.75, 
for which it is entitled to judgment." 
Respondent believes that the figure of $2,150.00 for cost 
of operation is over-stated. (Compare Exhibit A-3.) In 
the interest of terminating this litigation, however, re-
spondent is willing to accept the trial court's figure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRUE MEASURE OF RESPONDENT'S DAM· 
AGE FOR LOSS OF PROFITS FROM THE MACIITNE 
IN QUESTION IS ARRIVED AT BY DEDUCTING PRO· 
JECTE)D COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THAT MACHINE 
ONLY FROM RESPONDENT'S SHARE OF THE MA· 
CHINE'S PROJECTED GROSS REVENUE FOR THE 
CONTRACT PERIOD. 
The principal question raised on appeal is whether in 
dete1mining damages for loss of profits from operation of 
the machine the trial court must subtract a pro rata share 
of the costs attributable to all 83 machines, the operation 
of which cC!nstitutes respondent's business, or rather if the 
court need only subtract .thqse direct costs attributable 
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receipts only those costs exclusively attributable to the 
machine in question. 
POINT Il 
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THIE TRIAL COURT COULD iDETERMINE RE-
SPONDENT'S LOSS OF PROFITS, RESULTING FROM 
APPELLANT'S BREACH. 
That "damages cannot be found from mere speculat-
ive and conjectural evidence" (Bunnell v. Bills, 13 U1:Jah 
2d 83, 368 P2d 597, 602 (1962) ) is a sound and well estab-
lished principle of law which respondent does not here dis-
pute. A corollary principle, equally well established, is 
stated by this Court as follows: 
Where the plaintiff has shown actual loss of bus-
iness during the period as a result of defendant's breach. 
of contmct, he will not be denied recovery because the 
exact amount of damage cannot readily be ascertained. 
Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 Utah 2d 
187, 309 P2d 802, 805 (1957); and see numerous cases 
cited at footnote 3. 
The rule against speculative and conjectural evidence 
of damages is directed to evidence of the fact rather than 
evidence of the extent of damage: 
Courts indicate that there is a distinction between 
the quality of proof ne:::essary to establish the fact 
that the plainrtiff has sustained some damage and the 
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix 
the amount. Although formerly the tendency was to 
restrict the recovery to such matters as were suscep-
tible of having attached to them an exact pecuniary 
value, it is now generally held that the uncertainty 
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which prevents a recovery is uncertainty as to the 
fact of the damage and not as to its amount and that 
where it is reasonably certain that damage has re-
sulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not pre-
clude the right of recovery or prevent a jury decision 
awarding damages. This view has been sustained 
where, from the nature of the case, the extent of the 
injury and the amount of damage are not capable of 
exact and accurate proof. Under such circumstances, 
all that can be required is that the evidence-with such 
certainty as the nature of the particular case may per-
mit-lay a foundation which will enable the trier of 
facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate of the 
amount of damage. The plaintiff will not be denied 
a substantial recovery if he has produced the best evi-
dence available and it is sufficient to afford a reason-
able basis for estimating his loss. 22 Am Jur 2d 44, 
Damages Sec. 25; Gould case, supra, 309 P2d at 805-6. 
In the case at bar there was clear and precise evidence 
before the trial court of the exact amount of gross receipts 
from the machine for the eight months' period prior to ap-
pellant's breach. On the entirely reasonable assumption 
that average monthly revenue from the machine would 
remain constant for the remaining life of the contract, the 
trial court was able to determine the projected gross pro-
fits of respondent for the life of the contract. It is not 
understood that appellant disputes this assumption. 
further, there was clear evidence as to the estimated 
costs of operation attributable to the machine in question 
for the life of the contract. These costs are by their very 
nature estimates.. Appellant cannot breach his contract 
and then be heard to say that b8'cause the contract was not 
performed respondent's costs and therefore its damages 
are uncertain and unrecoverabie. Respondent's Exhibit 
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A-3 constituted adequate evidence of costs related to oper-
ation of the machine. The figures as to depreciation were 
arrived at in conformity with accepted accounting practice 
(Record, page 6) and those relating to maintenance and 
service costs were developed by dividing the actual costs 
for the business as a whole by the number of machines 
operated by the business (R. 109-111). 
It is, 1Jherefore, apparent that while the evidentiary 
dart.a from which respondent's loss of profits was calculated 
were estimated data, they were in no sense speculative, 
conjectural or "mere guess work". Rather, they represent 
rational extrapolations from known facts in accordance 
with sound accounting practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent is confident that this Honorable Court will 
act with wise restraint according to its settled rule that in 
the absence of abuse of his discretion "the question of ex-
cessive verdict must rest within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge ... " Gould Case, supra, 309 P2d at 807. 
Respondent urges that the verdict be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
JACKON B. HOWARD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
